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POLICY OF DEMOCRA TIZA TION AND SIGNIFICANCE OF 
THE CONFERENCE OF LOCAL ADMINISTRATION 
INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE 
By 
. Yasuhiko SHIMA * 
Foreword 
While Dr. Masao Kambe's numerous scholastic contributions to the project-
ed revision of the contemporary taxation and finance systems are of various 
importance, it is noteworthy that most of them are imbued with practical im-
plications. 
Although it should be readily conceded that the political situation in the 
pre-war Japan was never such that his theories could be translated into practice 
in their original shape, the policy of democratization which characterized the 
post-war propensity of Japan served to engender a circumstance where the famed 
scholar could bid farewell to his life of scholastic isolation with a good conscience 
and personally step into the arena of politics. 
Following the end of war, Dr. Kambe, then the Mayor of Kyoto, was 
asked to assume the chairmanship of the Conference of the Local Administra-
tion Investigation Committee. His new assignment appeared more appropriate 
because of his dominant preoccupation with the issues of democracy and local 
self-government, inasmuch as the committee (hereinafter called the Kambe 
Committee in abbreviation) was an organ for investigation, planning and ad-
vising. In the following lines, the present writer wishes to commemorate the 
achievements contributed by Dr. Kambe in the light of the advices tendered 
by the Kambe Committee. 
Before entering into any serious discussion of the issue, however, it should 
be noted that the committee's advices were principally occupied with the issues 
pertaining to a re-allocation of administrative affairs between the central and 
local governments. In view of this, the present writer wishes to begin his 
analysis of the situation with a study of the significance of such advices as per-
taining, especially, to the relevant financial aspect resulting from such re-alloca-
tion of administrative affairs. Various appraisal of the advices are possible 
either from the point of view of the state and prefectures or from that of local 
'" frqf<;:sso:r of Ecqnqmics at Kyoto UniverSity. 
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towns and villages. Sofar as the present writer is concerned, however, the mean-
ing of the advices will be studied mainly from the standpoint of towns and 
villages, including districts, the latter being especially spotlighted in connection 
with the post-war moves for democratization. Such limitation of the sphere of 
study in the present treatise bespeaks that the present writer, in dealing with the 
role of the Kambe Committee, is not qualified to pass a correct appraisal of 
these advices as a whole. * 
n. Period of Rivalry Between Democratization and Bureaucracy. 
As the Kambe Committee commenced its activity, the post-war Japan was 
facing a major turning point. Between December 22, 1950, when the Com-
mittee submitted its first recommendation on the "Allocation of Administrative 
Matters" and September 22, 1951, when it made its second report, a significant 
development had been witnessed: a peace conference had taken place at San 
Francisco in the autumn of 1951, while on May 1 General M. Ridgeway, 
Supreme Commander for Allied Powers, in an official statement, had empowered 
the Japanese government to review the Potsdam directives. In accordance with 
the new position enunciated by the SCAP, the Yoshida government, on May 
6, appointed a Directive Advisory Committee, entrusted with the deliberation 
on de-purging and revision of the anti-monopolization and labor laws as well 
as that of the administrative organization. This would mean that Japan's mo-
nopoly capitalists were allowed to re-assert themselves at about this time. It 
was obvious, then, that the Kambe Committee was pre-destined to face a big 
difficulty from the outset, for such developments were only too manifestly to 
block the progress of its work. 
Here, a review will be made of the situation which prevailed prior to these 
* To clarify the role of the Kambe Committee, the provisions of the relevant articles of the Law 
for the Establishment of the Conference of the Local Administration Investigation Committee will 
be cited below. 
Article 3. The Conference, for the purpose of implementing local self-government in order 
that national politics be further deI!locratized, shall undertake investigation and planning regarding 
the adjustment of the administrative affairs allocated betWeen the State and self-governing prefec-
tures, towns and villages, and shall submit advices resulting from such investigation to the 
Cabinet and to the National Diet through the Cabinet. 
Planning, mentioned in the preceding article, shall pertain to the following matters: 
1. Adjustment of administtative matters allocated between the State, on the one hand, and 
prefectures, cities, towns and villages, on the other. 
2. Adjustment of matters commissioned to local public organiZations for execution. 
3. Reform of the system concerning the State subsidies in connection with the business of 
adjustment mentioned in the two foregoing paragraphs. 
4. Such matters as required for adjustment of matters allocated between the State, prefectures, 
.cities, towns and villages, other than those matters already mentioned in the foregoing three parag-
raphs,. (These matters include those concerning the reform Qf t~ financial system ~d the merger 
9f loc~l towns and villa~s.)· " 
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developments, in an effort to clarify more vividly the significance of the inau-
guration of the Kambe Committee. 
The period between Japan's defeat in the war and the 1950-51 term will 
be tentatively called here as the time of the rivalry between democratization 
and bureaucracy or monopolistic State powers. 
It is generally conceded that the post-war democratization policy had to 
recede following GHQ.:s directive against the projected February I general st-
rike (January 31, 1946), the anti-Communism statement issued by Mr. Loyal, 
U.S. Secretary of War (January 6, 1948) and, in the sphere of local self-go-
vernment, the promulgation of Public Safety Law in Fukui City (July 7, 1948). 
It would be too naive, however, to discuss either progress or retrogression of 
Japan's course for democratization simply on account of such change in Ame-
rica's policy toward Japan. It might have been a result of internal confronta-
tion among factions of GHQ, And, so far as the Japanese nation, as a whole, 
had embarked upon the road to democratization under the guarantee of rele-
vant government measures, no overnight reverse of the course would be thin-
kable, inasmuch as the national move would be bound to serve as a support 
to the government stand. Even after the GHQ) directive against the Febru-
ary I general strike, the local self-government law was promulgated while the 
Home Ministry was ordered out of existence. 
The local self-government law underwent several subsequent revisions. 
These revisions, previous to the Ridgeway statement, were all in the direction 
of giving impetus to further democratization, no manifestly reactionary moves 
being noted. The promulgation of the public safety law initiated in Fukui 
City was followed by the promulgation of the local finance law and that for 
the inauguration of school board, while steps were taken on several occasions 
for transferring the State assets to local self-governing bodies. True, the local 
finances were placed under strict restrictions by the "Dodge Line" while 
officialdom was shaken by the "Red purge" followed by the promulgation 
of the Law of Local Public Servants. In spite of this, and, side by side 
with this, however, a tax revision on the advice of the Shoup Mission was 
enforced and the Kambe Commission was brought into being. In the light of 
such developments, the present writer is inclined to contend that the establish-
ment of the Kambe Committee was the product of a force working, both at 
home and abroad, for further democratization. 
It should not be lost sight of, however, that the time of democratization 
coincided with a deepening crisis for Japan's monopoly capitalism. Inflation-
ary measures were adopted, on the one hand, for the purpose of affording 
chances for a resurgence of monopoly capital, while, on the other, the war-
time centralized bureaucratic organization, although undergoing various degrees 
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of metamorphosis by force of the contemporary democratic trends, was utilized 
to a maximum, and, thus, the fruits of the democratization policy were often 
thwarted to better suit bureaucracy's whims. 
What, then, is the wartime centralized bureaucratic organization? As far 
as the financial aspect is concerned, it would be safe to assert that it was de-
finitely brought into being following a revision of the central and local finan-
cial mechanisms in 1940. As seen on the side of local towns, the revision was 
characterized by the following salient features: 
( 1) Regimentation of local administrative and financial organizations, and 
implementation of the system for adjusting local finances (system of tax distri-
bution) in order that an equilibrium be brought into these organizations; 
( 2) Implementation of the additional tax system of cities and towns. 
( 3) Transference of salary payment to the prefectural government from 
cities and towns, half of which to be subsidized by the State; and 
( 4) Abolition of the household quota and introduction of city and town 
tax defining the maximum imposition. 
Summed up, these apparently aimed at the strengthening of State control 
on the local finances, especially its administrative and financial functions. Note-
worthy was the reduction of the financial burdens traditionally borne by local 
inhabitants, particularly, farmers, as guaranteed by the provisions of the 
foregoing items ( 3) and ( 4), for the burden of expenses involved in the com-
pulsory elementary education as well as that of the household quota has been 
on the shoulders of the local farming districts and their inhabitants. The re-
duction, however, was actually a precurser to the introduction of a new tax 
burden - in the form of a direct levying of the national tax. 
Similar two-faced revision was also seen in a wartime reform of the agra-
rian administration undertaken at about the same time with the afore-said revi-
sion. 
In 1939, the government, acting in accordance with the provision of the 
General Mobilization Law, decreed for the control of farmers' rental. In the 
following year, rice was placed under government control, which was followed 
in 1941, by the decrees for the control of farmland, of farmland price and of 
agraian products. These series of government measures mean that important 
phases of agrarian production and distribution of farm products were' placed 
'under State control, and that the relation between the landowner and tenant 
farmer had to be adjusted in so far as such was necessitated for strengthened 
State interference. Thus, the effect of the wartime revisions of the local finan-
cial administrative mechanisms could be summed up in· the following vein: 
while the traditional financial burdens on the part of farmers pertaining to the 
support of the compulsory elementary educ'ltion? the household quota and ren, 
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tal were either abolished or placed under restrictions against further aggrava-
tion, a new burden was imposed by the State in the form of the levying of 
national tax and the forced delivery of cropped rice. 
While the relation between the State and local towns and villages after 
the war, as far as the financial, administrative and agrarian administrative as-
pects are concerned, has undergone major changes, the centralized bureaucratic 
mechanism in evidence between them, in a certain aspect, has been further 
strengthened. 
First, the vast effect brought in the status of local farming communities 
in consequence of the farmland reform and democratic local self-government 
should be cited among the most important factors accountable for the metamor-
phoses introduced after the war. It is needless to point out here that the farm-
land reforn, different from the wartime re-regimentation of the agrarian 
administration introduced around 1939, effected a fundamental change in the 
political and economic position of the landowner in a farming community. 
And, this was largely instrumental in making the reform of the local self-
governing system truly democratic. So far as the financial aspect of the reform 
of local self-government was concerned, the step was characterized by a gradual 
retrogression of the system of the additional tax enforced in 1939, and the al-
location by the State of admission and entertainment taxes as a stay for its 
financial autonomy. While the system of the distribution of tax revenue was 
more and more strengthened, such probably should not be viewed simply as a 
means to enforce the wartime system of centralization. For the fact that more 
financial support is being given by the State to the local self-governing bodies 
at a time when a system had been established for public elections of mayors 
and townmasters, for the implementation of local assemblies and for a direct 
participation of local inhabitants in national and local politics, could mean that 
the State has come out with a stronger financial guarantee of local autonomous 
government. 
Especially in the case of farming communities in Japan, it would be sim-
ply unthinkable that any degree of local autonomy functions as such without 
a financial backup by the State. This aspect will be made clear through a 
comparison with the financial situation which prevailed in rural communities 
in pre-war years, say, before 1940. In those years, the only financial guarantee 
offered by the State was in the form of the expenses for the compulsory pri-
mary education, which were paid by the National Treasury. Otherwise, the 
farming communities, then, were asked to pay for the increasing amount of 
commissioned national administrative matters through allotting an exhorbitant 
sum of household quota. After the war, the situation somewhat improved: 
?s far as the principle was concerned, the commissioned national business w~~ 
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to be attended to with the distributed tax revenue and government subsidies. 
It would seem to be out of point to define rigidly that peculiarly local mat-
ters should be financed with independent locally-levied taxes, for, the present 
writer believes, the issue of local autonomy should begin with a democra-
tization of local government, the question of whether local finances should 
be supported by the State or by locally-levied taxes being of a secondary 
importance. * 
Survey will now be made of another aspect, where no such fundamental 
change has taken place, and where the wartime bureaucratic control was rather 
strengthened. For a post-war rehabilitation of the monopoly capitalistic insti-
tution, a guaranteed supply of cheap labor was absolutely necessary, which, in 
other words, implied that the price of rice should be kept at a low level. 
Encouragement was further given to the turn-in of the allotted amount of rice 
crops. Secondly, it was deemed necessary, for a similar purpose, that the finan-
cial institution be so re-constituted that funds may be sucked up from the farm-
ing areas to be poured into big businesses for their rapid recovery. This in-
evitably entailed larger amount of State taxes levied from the rural districts. 
In 1947 when this trend was at its height more than 80 % of the direct taxes 
paid by the rural communities consisted of State taxes, with local village taxes 
amounting to mere 9 %. Not only the financial funds but also private money 
were sucked up through the rural financial organs, which found their way to 
big banks and businesses. And, naturally, local loans were still kept under a 
rigid State control. 
A new exploitation of the rural community through the strengthened re-
quirements for rice deli very, the payment of State taxes and offering of funds 
for the recovery of big businesses amounted to such an extent that it was suf-
ficient to offset the effect of local autonomy, of which mention has been made 
earlier. 
The local communities, thus, were unavoidably forced to suffer an acute 
financial destitution. The independent taxes, allotted to them, remained nomi-
nal, and, they, as far as finances were concerned, had no other alternative 
than to seek aid from the State. Seen from this angle, the series of financial 
measures, already referred to, which were supposed to guarantee local autonomy, 
were, on the contrary, nothing but the tools in the hands of the State to sub-
* The same thing may be said of primary school education. The fact that in 1940, the State 
stepped in to relieve local cities and towns of their financial burdens to pay primary school tea-
chers. would mean that education Was placed under State control. Following a general demo-
cratization of local government and education after the war and the subsequent inauguration of 
the system of the school board. the afore-mentioned measure Was suffixed with an added meaning 
that the expenses for compulsory primary education would be guaranteed by the State, and, as 
such, would appear to be Consonant to the general trend for the democratization of the educational 
system. 
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ordinate and manupulate local finances. For example, the system of distribu-
ted taxes, subject to an unlimited discretion of central government officials, 
served, as a matter of fact, as a means to subordinate local governing bodies 
to the wills of the State bureaucratic benchmen in order that the centralization 
be further implemented. The subsidies from the national treasury, which had 
been mainly in the form of subsidies for rice delivery ever since 1940, came 
to include, as well, State financial aid to local farmland commissions, which, 
ironically enough, were more instrumental in further cementing the system of 
centralization and bureaucracy's hegemony, than the afore-mentioned distributed 
taxes. The situation had another ironical repercussion, for the very policy of 
democratization brought local finances into an aggravated condition of destitu-
tion, as exemplified in the case of the already-destitute rural communities being 
faced with the dire necessity of directly undertaking the construction of local 
school buildings. This, again, naturally tended to enhance the prestige of cent-
ral bureaucracy. 
The series of the offensive exploitation of the farming communities in the 
form of the forced rice delivery and levying of State taxes could not but evoke 
a strong reaction among the agrarian population, who, conscious of their com-
mon stand with the inflation-menaced factory labors, partially moved forward 
to stage a joint struggle with the latter. The exploitation of local finances and 
economy, especially through the retrenchment policy of the "Dodge Line" was 
to such an extent that even the authorities of local governments were in some 
cases seen to move in an anti-governmental direction. That, in the general 
election held in 1949, no less than 35 Communists were elected to the House 
of Representatives, although the majority of the Diet seats was occupied by the 
conservative Democratic-Liberal Party, should be taken as an indication of the 
situation then prevailing. It looked' as though a major political landslide was 
in the making even in rural districts if the situation was left unchecked and 
unremedied. 
Under the circumstances, it was a matter of urgency that the extent of 
State explOitation of local finances be reduced. And, such reduction could be 
obviously undertaken in two different directions. * One would be for furtherance 
of the post-war policy of democratization, while the other would aim at strength-
* About the directions mentioned above, it would be more to the point, in the light of the ac· 
tual course of things, to say as follows, The move for democratization raised among the people 
progressed beyond the limits imposed by the Occupation policy and was directed toward a racial 
independence. Japan's monopoly capitalists, on the other hand, although favorably affected by 
the Korean War, were brought to become conscious of conflicting interests in their relation to Ame-
rican capitalists. Thus. they had no other alternative than to aim at an .. autonomy" of their 
own interests at the sacrifice of the popular movement for racial independence. This, of course, 
meant that the people were deprived of the fruits of the post-war democratization policy, 
THE CONFERENCE OF LOCAL ADMINISTRATION IKVESTIGA TION COMMITTEE 63 
ening the "autonomy" of monopoly capital. Significantly, the course adopted 
by the Japanese government, at this juncture, was the latter alternative. 
m. Report of the KaD1be COD1D1ission and After. 
Before appraising the report of the Kambe Commission, it would be ne-
cessary to definitely take cognizance of the fact that Japan's politics, at this 
juncture, were heading toward either one or the other of the afore-mentioned 
two directions at the same time that the comprehensive reform carried out on 
the basis of the Shoup advice be correctly adjudged in the light of such 
course Japan's politics were about to take. 
The policy of the "Dodge Line," aiming at a reduction of State control 
'and of government subsidies and investments to local industries and governing 
communities, was evidently in the direction of a stronger " autonomy" on the 
'part of Japan's monopoly capitalists, on the basis of which a new economic 
relationship between Japan and the United States was to be established. Pro-
. gress, as far as this aspect was concerned, had been as projected following the 
business boom brought about by the Korean War and up till the time of the 
San Francisco Conference on a Japanese peace treaty. 
The Shoup reform, compared with this, was pregnant with more contra-
. dictory elements, for it was seen to embody at the same time the two different 
directions mentioned earlier. The Shoup recommendations on a reformed sys-
'tem of national taxes, including a reduction of income and corporate taxes and 
on a capital revaluation, were obviously in the direction of a recovery of "au-
tonomy" on the part of monopoly capital and capital accumulation, and, 
in this sense, were akin to the standpoint of the Dodge Line. The plan, on 
the other hand, was intent on pushing ahead popular democratization, and, 
through it, local self-government. The plan for a reform of local finances, as 
proposed by Shoup, however, was such that its literal execution would be out 
of question unless a re-distribution of administrative matters between the central 
and local governments was undertaken. Called a "re-distribution" of admin-
'istrative matters, it actually amounted to a re-adjustment of the bureaucratic 
'organization between the central and local governments. 
Now, the issue of a "re-distribution," complicated as it was, was entrusted 
to the deliberations of the Kambe Commission, and that aspect of the . Shoup 
recommendations which pertained to a projected reform of local financial insti-
tutions was singled out for a quick execution. Seen in this light, Shoup's state-
ment, contained in the preface to the Report by the Shoup Mission, that "All 
of the major recommendations, and many of the minor ones, are interconnected. 
If any of the major recommendations are eliminated, some of the others will 
thereby become of less value, or even harmful." would apparently apply in its 
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entity to the reform of local finances recommended by Shoup himself. This is 
to say that the recommendation on a reform of local finances was simply imprac-
ticable unless it was accompanied with an equitable readjustment of administra-
tive affairs between the central and local governments. 
It is, thus, made clear that the commissioning to the Kambe Commission 
of a most complicated and difficult task, i.e. a re-distribution of administrative 
affairs between the central and local governments, took place at a most difficult 
time. In so far, however, as the Shoup recommendations were intrinsically 
contradictory, as described above, the recommendation made by the Kambe 
Commission could favorably compare with them because of its logical unity 
and cohesiveness, this, of course, being the result of the Commission having 
been entrusted with only the issue of democratization, and, hence, of the fur-
therance of local self-government. In some sense, thus, the Kambe report may 
even be adjudged as an expression of the concept typical of the age of demo-
cratization. 
Now, the Kambe report started with a reiteration, adjustment and materi-
alization of the principles of the re-allocation of administrative matters contained 
in the Shoup recommendations. These included, firstly, the principle of the 
clarification of administrative responsibility, secondly, the principle of efficiency, 
and, thirdly, the principle of the priority of local public bodies, especially, ci-
ties and towns. 
The first principle pertaining to the clarification of administrative responsi-
bility asks for a definitely. defined allocation of specific lines of administrative 
affairs to the State, prefectures and local towns, respectively, thus clarifying 
where responsibility regarding a particular sphere of business rests, and, for the 
provision of adequate funds for discharging such responsibility in a proper way. 
The second principle of efficiency stands for the contention that every line of 
administrative matter should be allocated to such an organ, which, in view of 
its structural scale as well as its administrative and financial position, is best 
suited to dispose of it in a most efficient manner. In the light of this principle, 
it would follow that providing for respective lines of administrative matter uni-
formly should be avoided as far as possible, and that the prefectural govern-
ment should be allowed to intervene in case specific towns or villages are con-
sidered void of either administrative or financial ability to attend to a certain 
line of matters which should be disposed ordinarily by such sub-prefectural 
organs. 
The third and last principle of the priority to local towns and villages pro-
vides for commissioning administrative matters, as far as possible, to the lowest-
level administrative organ which stands closest to the people at large. In the 
order of priority, thus, municipalities, towns and villages will rank the first, fol-
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lowed by the prefectural government and by the State, which will handle only 
such matters as may not be efficiently disposed of locally. 
This principle automatically leads to the conclusion that measures should be 
taken to bring out a merger of local cities and towns just for the purpose of 
improving their administrative and financial position as well as rationalizing their 
administrati ve scale. The first recommendation contained a proposal, as an issue 
necessitated relative to a satisfactory redistribution of administrative matters, for 
effecting such merger, the criterion of population for each administrative unit 
being placed at around 7,000-8,000 people. 
It should be noted, in this connection, that the merger of cities and towns 
is beneficial for strengthening local autonomy only when it is realized in rela· 
tion to the afore-mentioned three principles. Their merger which has so far 
been brought about, however, has, in the main, amounted to a departure from 
these fundamental concepts in that political considerations running counter to 
the basic idea of democracy have in most cases been the driving motive behind 
the move, and, as such, it should be considered to have been a measure entirely 
alien to the proposal advanced by the Kambe Commission. 
A study of the three principles makes it at once clear that the Kambe 
proposal was in manifest opposition to the whole range of the bureaucratic 
institution binding, vertically, the State, prefectures and local municipalities. 
How, then, did the recommendation interpret the relationship between these 
three-stage administrative units? The recommendation said, in substance: 
Where the modern economic structure has attained a certain degree of 
development, the relations between the State and local public communities are 
so complicatedly intertwined, that every line 'of local administrative affairs is 
liable to affect the State and become a target of national attention. This, how-
ever, should never be utilized as a sufficient excuse for refusing to place these 
administrative business in charge of the lowest-level administrative organ, which 
is most easily accessible to the people in general. In the past, however, the 
central government has consistently taken a stand that, because of their national 
concern, these administrative affairs should be placed in the hands of the State, 
while a faction of business was commissioned to local public organs, a proper 
disposal of which being made obligatory to the latter and the State exercising 
only the right of direction and supervision. 
In short, the method and scope of disposing of administrative matters on 
the part of each of these three-stage administrative organs has been' entirely 
subject to a decision by the State, which, on its part, has made it obligatory, 
by dint of law and subsidies, for these public organs to attend to a proper ex-
ecution of the entrusted business. The routine, naturally, has made ambiguous 
exactly where the responsibility rested at the same time that the nation was left 
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in the dark as to how the taxes they paid were being used. 
The recommendation, in an obvious effort to remedy the situation, suggests 
that the State, on the one hand, and local public organs, on the other, should divide 
their respective orbits of business through each administrative affair for which 
a responsible party is clearly defined, and extend cooperation to each other. 
Inasmuch as, however, most of the administrative affairs commissioned to local 
organs are of national concern and interests, the State should be expected to 
step in for a balanced distribution of business, with, if need be, advices and 
aid being offered. Again, in case the commissioning and execution of such 
business is to be obligatory, the State should define its scope and scale by force 
of law, while, provided a local public organ fails or neglects to properly dispose 
of the business, the State, as a matter of principle, should not interfere forcibly, . 
allowing the situation to be remedied by force of the public opinion raised 
among the local popUlation. 
The afore-mentioned principles relative to a redistribution of administrative 
matters will automatically point to the pattern of a reform of the financial setup, 
without which no re-adjustment of business will be expected to function pro-
perly. 
First comes the system of the independent tax. It is obvious that, with 
a clear definition of the scope of administrative matters commissioned to the 
three-stage administrative organs, each of them, especially local municipalities 
and towns, should be equipped with a system of such an independent taxation 
which will enable them, financially, to take care of the entrusted business. As 
a result of the re-distribution of administrative matters, the State and prefectural 
governments will come to have a much reduced financial setup, and, as a con-
sequence and in proportion to the reduction thus effected, local cities and towns 
will be provided with considerably expanded financial sources, according to the 
recommendation. 
Secondly comes the issue of the equalization grants. The recommendation 
suggests that, in order to allow the system of equalization grants to function in 
such a way that it will serve to adjust local finances at the same time that 
their autonomy is not interfered with, the basic financial requirements of a 
local public organ should remain within the limits that the execution of legally-
commissioned administrative matters is enabled, with the excess over the basic 
revenue for the specific organ being covered with the equalization grants. 
Thirdly, the recommendation, pointing out the tendency that the subsidies 
from the State are liable to tum into the means of State control of local fi-
nances and, thus, bring in confusion in the relation of administrative responsibility 
between the State and local public organs, advised that these subsidies should 
be curtailed as far as feasible and that local financial needs be met by general 
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revenue sources. 
Fourthly, the recommendation, turning to the question of local loans, sug-
gested that, as far as the fundamental principle goes, issuance of local loans, 
within the limits of the maximum issue ceiling, should be freed from the exist-
ing control provisions and left to the discretion of local public organs. It was 
also recommended that the way should be opened for a public subscription to 
loans issued, and that, as a means to assist financially-weak local organs, a pub-
lic safe, specifically charged with shouldering such loans, be set up. Mention 
should be made here of the fact that the strict provisions of control in force 
have since 1951 been most instrumental in forcing local finances into the pre-
sent condition of destitution and also that the Public Enterprise Financing Safe 
recently brought into being is an institution diametrically different in nature 
from what the Kambe recommendation proposed for. 
In the first recommendation described above, a re-distribution of admi-
nistrative matters, merger of local cities and towns and a reform of local finan-
ces constitute a logical entity and none of these may be dispensed with without 
harming the entity they make up. In so far as this holds, it was nothing less 
than a drastic proposal of revision of the existing system of bureaucracy. And, 
through the recommendation, an unswerving confidence placed in local autonomy 
and democratic institution could be clearly observed. This should be more sig-
nificant in the light of the general tendency in Japan's politics in recent years, 
where indications are not few of local autonomy and democracy being placed 
in discredit. 
The second recommendation is somewhat different in nature from the first. 
It has already been mentioned that interposed between the first and second 
recommendations was the statement by General M. Ridgeway, SCAP. 
Apparently the Kambe Commission was thinking of re-revising the results 
of financial reforms undertaken in accordance with the Shoup recommendations 
if its suggestions regarding a re-distribution of administrative matters had been 
duly accepted by the Government. Actually, however, such was not the case: 
the proposal had not been taken up seriously by the Government. Despite 
this, the Shoup recommendations regarding revision of the local financial struc-
ture had already been put into practice. To make the situation worse, the 
conservative forces as well as bureaucrats, encouraged by the afore-mentioned 
Ridgeway statement, were energetically maneuvering to distort the very Shoup 
suggestions so as to make them better serve the purposes of consolidating the 
centralized system, this in spite of the fact that they, as well as the Kambe re-
commendations, had started from the standpoint of local autonomy. It was on this 
ground that the second recommendation by the Kambe Commission, while de-
fending the principles underlying the Shoup recommendations, boldly criticized 
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the way they were being put into practice, which it considered erroneous and 
mistaken. 
Most seriously affected by the Shoup reforms was the system of equalization 
grants, which embodied the most advanced concept and construction of local 
autonomy. Shoup'S notion itself had a drawback. The system of equalization 
grants, as is well known, provides for the assessment of the basic financial 
requirements and revenue of a particular local public organ, and, in case the 
former surpasses the latter, for assuring .the surplus by the national treasury. 
As was pointed out by the recommendation, the system makes it inevitable 
that a frontal conflict occurs between all ranges of central administration and the 
local financial setup inasmuch as the latter, in assessment, covers the entire sphere 
oflocal administration, comprising education, civil engineering, industry, economy, 
police and fire-fighting. Furthermore, it is only natural that all financial require-
ments on the part of a local public organ should be woven into the equaliza-
tion grants, which, as a consequence, will come to be asked to play an unduly 
big role in local finances. The assessment units of the basic financial require-
ments, again, are often irrational, resulting in the ambiguity in the propriety 
of specific expenditures, which is only too often apt to be used for an excuse to 
shirk a reduction in the expenditures as required. This results in a failure by 
all parties concerned to be convinced of the propriety of the amount of 
equalization grants to be made available, and, consequently, in a quarrel 
between the central and local interested parties. This is liable to lead to 
giving room to the intervention by personal whims and caprices as well as to 
an intensified petitioning campaigns directed against the central government 
officials, such being what Shoup had hardly expect;ed for. 
Contending that the existing mechanism of the equalization grants assess-
ment constituted one of the fundamental causes for the unbalanced expansion 
of local finances, the authorities of the central government strongly proposed a 
return to the old system of distributed tax. Thus, the chiefs of local towns 
and villages, who earlier had wholeheartedly welcomed the concept of equaliza-
tion grants, now found themselves disgruntled with the way it functioned be-
cause, under the system, the required amount would not easily be appropriated, 
and, instead, turned to government subsidies, which it was obligatory to the 
central government to offer. None better did the prefectural governments fare 
in this regard. They came to look the more scientific system of equalization 
grants with utter discredit; they relied more on "petitionings," which implied 
their increasingly jealous approaches to the conservative forces in Tokyo. 
The problem of how to keep the system of equalization grants functioning, 
thus, provided an occasion for the loss of coordination among prefectural and 
municipal governments, with local public organs, as a whole, being forced to 
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turn their back against democratization as a political concept. 
The second recommendation submitted by the Kambe Commission, ma-
king a bold defence of the spirit of the equalization grants, focussed its atten-
tion on the remedying of its defects as a system. The effort reached to the 
conclusion, in effect, that the scope of the basic financial requirements should 
be within the range of such administrative affairs, the execution of which is 
made obligatory by law. It should be evident, however, that, for a clear de-
finition of the obligatory expenses and the amount of equalization grants to 
cover them, a re-distribution of administrative matters and of independent re-
venue sources should take place among the three-stage administrative organs. 
Following the submission of a report by the Government Decree ,Advisory 
Commission set up on the basis of the Ridegway statement, the projected revi-
sion of the Law of Local Autonomy assumed the direction for increased effici-
ency and rationalization of both central and local administrative organs, person-
nel retrenchment and a more pronounced centralization. This coincided with 
a rapid development of a political move on the part of monopoly capitalists 
for added autonomy. Moving along this line, steps were taken for a relaxation 
of rural exploitation by Statebacked capitalists, lessening of State taxes and for-
cible rice delivery. Substantially relieved by these series of measures as well 
as the fruits of the farmland reform, the agrarian communities, after 1951, found 
themselves in a position to receive special government subsidies in view of their 
sustained damages due to snowfalls and severity of weather, etc., and, as a matter 
of fact, moved to strongly support the Liberal Party, Mr. Shigeru Yoshida, its 
leader, being thus enabled to consolidate the foundation of his third cabinet 
then in power. 
It was obvious, however, that the policy of distributing such government 
subsidies, amounting to meagre sums, among the rural districts, ran counter to 
the policy of administrative readjustment through both the central and local 
governments. Criticisms gradually gained momentum. "People's voice" aga-
inst the policy of subsidies, proved weak in comparison with the voice raised 
in unison by such offices as the Ministry of Finance and the Board of 
Administration Control as well as leading capitalists' organizations. The latter 
gave impetus to the move for rehabilitation and readjustment of local finances. 
This, however, amounted to an attack directed against the inconsiderate spending 
of money on the part of local public organs, and, as such, was a political course 
emanating from a fundamental distrust of the concept of local autonomy and 
democracy. 
In 1953, the policy of encouraging merger of local towns and villages was 
unfurled on a major scale. This policy, again, was a departure from the Ka-
mbe recommendation and W'lS rather an exemplification of a concept running 
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counter to its spirit, for the move inevitably tended to allure towns and villages 
to the direction of further centralization, while placing the entire responsibility 
only at their doors. The circumstance had to be taken note of even by the 
central authorities concerned. An assertion that the successful execution of the 
policy for the merger of towns and villages, while the policy of a readjustment 
of central and local administration has so far failed to bear any fruits, should 
be a source of gratification as well as pride on the part of the authorities of 
local governments, quoted in "The Study of Self-Government," No.1, Edition 
31, should be taken as an affirmation that the policy of merger is more in-
clined to an eventual administrative readjustment rather to a furtherance of 
local self-government and that the party principally responsible for the alleged 
" squandering" of public money is even now left unmolested. 
IV. Conclusion: De1l1ocracy and the Role of 
The Student of Social Sciences 
The post-war policy of democratization, through many turns and twists, 
faced a major turning point in 1951. Although the popular moves for democ-
ratization had to be deprived, one after another, of the systematical guarantees in 
this respect, the movement in itself has never receded, and, in some instances, 
it may even be said to have trespassed the confines of the democratization poli-
cy. And, it would not seem entirely without significance to review at this 
juncture the recommendations submitted by the Kambe Commission, a body 
conceived on a fundamental trust in the concept of local autonomy and demo-
cracy. 
Dr. Kambe was not the sole instance of scholars, who, willy-nilly, had to 
bid farewell to the secluded world of learning and step into that of politics. 
A number of other leading scholars of social sciences responded to calls to serve 
as members of Diet sub-committees, of either central or local administrative 
committees set up after the war or in the capacity of advisers to the political 
parties. Dr. Shoup himself, who was instrumental in bringing the Kambe 
Commission into being, was an expert of finances. 
The following point should also be taken into consideration; in the post-
war years when democratization was the signal mark of the times, the Japanese 
nation, probably for the first time in their history, although, initially, prompted 
under the protection offered by the Occupation Force, began to think about 
criticizing their old institutions, about the independence of scientific research 
and about embodying in themselves the freedom of learning, democratic conduct 
and ethical concept. Finding themselves in such environment, the students of 
social sciences in Japan were enabled to be freed from the pre-war and wartime 
constraints and boldly preach about free thinking and reform of the convention-
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al social systems. Constituting one of the typical examples of the contempo-
rary proposals for reform, the Kambe recommendations probably will have to 
accept criticisms as being too idealistic or fantastic. The blame, however, 
should be at the doors of the contemporary political current which failed to 
take the recommendations with a serious mind, than at those of the very recom-
mendation or the concept embodied in these scholars. 
After the particular period in question, even the American scholar, who 
had been reputedly the main stay and support of the policy of democratization 
adopted in Japan, is said to have remarked to the effect that the attempted 
reform of the Japanese local government system was simply an endeavor to 
adorn the Japanese framework with the "furnishings" of the American-version 
democracy. It was also reported that the American, who was directly respon-
sible for the reform of Japan's local government structure was a mere uninitiated 
amateur. Aside from these irresponsible remarks, it is noted, Japanese students 
of social sciences were divided over the issue of local self-government. It 
should be conceded, however, that, so long as the political course continues to 
run counter to the spirit of democratization, no rehabilitation or reform, in the 
true sense of the terms, of local finances is possible. This being especially 
true in the case of Japan, the significance of the Kambe recommendations 
should be worth a renewed appraisal. 
